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Abstract 
While emissions trading schemes are developed by nations to mitigate their greenhouse 
gas emissions, behavioural studies have shown that the political and public acceptability 
of these market-based instruments depends on the way the associated revenues are used. 
One option the general public approves of is to use them to support renewable energy. 
If this consists in reducing a pre-existing electricity levy that heterogeneously applies to 
the various sectors of the economy, the reduction of this distortionary tax thanks to the 
carbon revenues results in general equilibrium effects that may have unequal sectoral 
impacts. This is what we examine in the case of the European Union. With a modelling 
approach including a detailed disaggregation of European sectors, we find that using 
auction revenues from the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to support electricity 
generation from renewable sources results in a 2% rise in electricity demand in the 
whole economy due to the reduced electricity levy that electricity consumers have to 
pay to support renewable energy. This results in a 1.8% ETS carbon price increase. The 
carbon constraint for the non-ETS sectors is 5.9% looser as a consequence of the larger 
electricity use by these sectors. While the energy intensive sectors generally benefit 
from electricity levy exemptions, we observe that, due to the energy and ETS price 
increase, the combination of these exemptions and of the use of carbon auction revenues 
to support renewable energy makes the ETS sectors worse off than if carbon revenues 
are transferred to households. In aggregate, the recycling option analysed here results in 
a GDP gain due to its impacts on the non-ETS sectors, the reduction of the electricity 
levy and associated distortionary effects. 
Keywords: 
Carbon auctions; renewable energy support; electricity levy; emissions trading 
scheme; revenues recycling. 
JEL classification: 
C68, E62, H21, H23, Q42, Q54 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Negative environment externalities may be corrected by policy instruments such as subsidies 
or taxes. Their efficiency respectively depends on the resources used to finance them and on how 
the corresponding revenues are used. Pigouvian taxes tend to be more efficient than subsidies as 
the associated revenues can be recycled to reduce other taxes (see Ballard and Medema, 1993). 
Despite this, the general public usually prefers subsidies, as shown for example by Heres et al. 
(2015). There are various reasons for this, one of which is the fact that the cost of the subsidy is 
less visible for the general public than a tax (Harrison, 2010). The public acceptability of taxes is 
improved if information is provided on how the corresponding revenues are used, and, in 
particular, if they are earmarked for environmental purposes (Kallbekken et al, 2011; Kallbekken 
and Aasen, 2010). 
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In the field of climate policy, this is particularly true for political debates regarding carbon 
pricing1 vs. renewable energy (RE) or innovation support policies. Despite the fact that economists 
usually consider emissions trading schemes (ETS) as cost-efficient measures to reduce emissions, 
cap-and-trades are not always well perceived by politicians and the general public. That is visible 
in the United States, where several federal cap-and-trade proposals were discussed and analysed 
(e.g. by Gurgel et al., 2011), but never adopted. On the contrary, financial support for renewable 
energy or innovation benefits from a much higher political acceptability. Still, while supporting 
renewable energy may have various political objectives (e.g. climate policy, energy independence, 
competitiveness), it might be rather inefficient with regard to emissions reductions. Marcantonini 
and Ellerman (2015), for example, have computed the implicit abatement cost of renewable energy 
incentives in Germany and found that it might be substantially higher than an ETS price. 
Behavioural studies have suggested that the public and political acceptability of carbon markets 
depends on the design of these schemes and in particular on the way the associated revenues are 
used. Vollebergh et al. (1997), for example, show that hybrid systems of grandfathering and 
auctions can improve the political acceptability of carbon pricing. Bristow et al. (2010) study the 
public acceptability of personal carbon trading in comparison with a carbon tax. The authors show 
that the initial permits allocation and the use made of the carbon revenues are important design 
features in this regard.2 
It seems possible to improve the public acceptability of ETS’s by actually using the carbon 
revenues for climate and energy purposes. One of these purposes could be the support of renewable 
energy deployment. In a way, this is a solution to the debate mentioned above on the ways to 
correct environmental externalities by combining carbon pricing and subsidies rather than 
opposing them. The economic impacts of such a recycling choice depends on the pre-existing RE 
policy framework. In particular, if the latter relies on the use of an electricity levy, employing the 
carbon revenues to reduce this tax is expected to result in efficiency gains. The aim of this paper 
is to analyse the economic consequences of using carbon revenues to support RE-based power 
generation, as a function of the specific characteristics of the pre-existing RE policy funding. It 
extends the literature on environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes (e.g. Bovenberg and 
Goulder, 1996; Nordhaus, 1993; Ballard and Medema, 1993) to carbon pricing in the form of an 
ETS, in the presence of a specific distortionary commodity tax - the electricity levy - that applies 
heterogeneously to the various sectors of the economy. While the efficiency loss associated with 
the use of a distortionary tax is well known, the benefit from reducing such a tax, thanks to the 
revenues from a Pigouvian tax when the application of the distortionary tax is heterogeneous 
among sectors, is worth being investigating. The general equilibrium effects that take place may 
                                                 
1 An overview of carbon pricing instruments developed in the world is provided by World Bank and Ecofys (2018). 
In particular, carbon markets expand around the world with currently 21 operational emissions trading schemes 
covering around 7.4 billion tCO2e in 2018 (ICAP 2018). 
2 In line with these results, the survey analysis conducted by Amdur et al. (2014) showed that, in the US, for both 
democrats and republicans, the support for a carbon tax is significantly higher when the revenues are planned to 
be used for renewable energy support. 
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indeed result in unequal sectoral benefits. This is what we examine in the context of an ETS instead 
of a Pigouvian tax. 
Given the European experience in terms of carbon pricing and RE support policy, we take the 
European Union (EU) as a case study for our analysis. The EU ETS started in 2005 (EU, 2003). 
This instrument is the cornerstone of the EU climate and energy policy. The latter was specifically 
agreed upon by the EU leaders in the 2020 climate and energy package and then in the 2030 climate 
and energy framework (EC, 2014a). Together with the objective of a 40% reduction of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels, the agreement includes a target of 32% of 
renewable energy sources in energy consumption, and an overall goal of 32.5% energy savings 
compared with the business-as-usual trend. Member States are free to choose the instruments to 
support RE deployment:3 feed-in tariffs, premiums, green certificates, etc. Since 2013 companies 
have had to buy an increasing proportion of permits through auctions (EC, 2010). The amended 
EU ETS Directive (EU, 2009) stipulates Member States are free to decide how they use carbon 
auction revenues, but that they have to use at least 50% of the auction revenues for climate and 
energy related purposes. Among others, auction revenues can be used to support renewable energy. 
Depending on the way Member States fund their RE policy and given the fact that the electricity 
sector itself is covered by the ETS, we expect that the use of carbon auction revenues to subsidize 
RE-based power generation leads to general equilibrium effects that deserve to be examined. In 
most Member States, RE support is financed by an electricity levy (paid by electricity consumers, 
including some industries covered by the ETS), while in others (the United Kingdom, Poland and 
Finland) the funding comes from the general public budget (paid by tax payers). In this empirical 
context of the EU, the paper examines the economic impacts of such a recycling option on the 
whole economy4 and in particular on the various industrial sectors, depending on their energy 
intensities, the type of renewable energy support used and potentially associated exemption rules. 
After collecting and combining detailed sectoral level data on the EU industry, we integrate them 
in the PACE5 modelling structure and develop the latter to conduct the analysis. 
We find that using an electricity levy to reduce RE leads to a 0.2% GDP loss for the economy 
due to the associated distortion in comparison with public support for RE. Moreover, we observe 
that if an electricity levy is used, recycling auction revenues to support renewable energy generally 
benefits the EU economy more than if these revenues were transferred to households as lump-sum 
rebates (GDP loss of 0.1% instead of 0.2%). This is because the auction revenues allow to reduce 
the electricity levy and the associated distortion. The impact on each economic sector is a 
combination of three effects: the positive effect of the reduction in the electricity levy for the 
industrial electricity consumers, the negative effect of an increased carbon price for the sectors 
covered by the carbon market, and a positive demand effect related to the increase in the economic 
activity. The final outcome is small but positive for the most electricity intensive non-ETS sectors, 
                                                 
3 For recent information on how Member States support renewable electricity, we refer the reader to the RES 
LEGAL website: www.res-legal.eu. 
4 Our analysis focuses on the short-run impacts. 
5 Policy Analysis based on Computable Equilibrium 
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or for those, such as the transport sector, that benefit from the increased demand from the whole 
economy. It is balanced for the other non-ETS sectors. For the ETS sectors, the benefit is clear if 
they are not exempted from the electricity levy, but if they are, their benefit from this exemption 
is reduced when recycling carbon auctions are used to support RE due to the increase in energy 
and carbon prices (1.6% higher ETS price) induced by the electricity demand rise (-2.2%) in the 
rest of the economy. 
Section 2 presents the quantitative framework developed and used for the analysis. Section 3 
describes the policy simulations considered. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. QUANTITATIVE FRAMEWORK  
 This section covers the numerical general equilibrium framework employed for the 
analysis. We first present the data sources used. We explain the work conducted on them to obtain 
the level of sectoral detail needed for the analysis while ensuring consistency of the whole 
numerical framework. We then describe the modelling structure and the specific features 
developed to pursue the analysis. 
2.1 Data 
To analyse the interaction effects between auction revenues recycling and electricity levy 
exemption rules for energy-intensive sectors, we need detailed inputs for these industrials sectors. 
To do so, we use data from the GTAP 9.1 database (Global Trade Analysis Project), which we 
disaggregate and complement with inputs from the EU 2016 Reference Scenario (EC, 2016).  The 
GTAP 9.1 database (Global Trade Analysis Project) provides the most recent consistent accounts 
of production, consumption, and bilateral trade flows for the reference year 2011. But, despite a 
rather comprehensive regional and sectoral coverage, this database does not provide sufficient 
sectoral detail about the energy-intensive industries. We hence apply disaggregation procedures to 
several energy-intensive sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).6 We 
use SplitCom routines (Horridge, 2008) to perform the sectoral disaggregation and refer the 
readers to Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2012) for procedural information on this issue.7 Also, as the 
representation of the other sectors and regions in GTAP 9.1 is too specific for the purpose of this 
paper, we aggregate them. The model used for this sector covers 23 regions and 36 sectors 
(extractives activities, industries covered by the EU ETS, industries not covered by the EU ETS, 
services). EU regions include France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, the 
                                                 
6 The following GTAP sectors have been disaggregated: Chemical products, rubber and plastics (into organic 
chemicals, inorganic chemicals, fertilisers, other chemicals, rubber, plastics); Non-metallic minerals (into 
cement, glass, ceramics, bricks and tiles, other non-metallic minerals); Iron and steel (into basic production and 
further processing of iron and steel); Non-ferrous metals (into aluminium and other non-ferrous metals). 
7 The principle of the disaggregation routine is to find shares of production, consumption, trade and the intermediate 
production structure of the subsector within the aggregate sector. SplitCom then uses these shares to compute 
respective flows for the new subsectors and balances the input-output structure. 
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other western Member States and the other Eastern Member States (the detailed regional coverage 
is reported in the appendix). The sectoral coverage is presented in Table 1. 
For the base year, we derive CO2 emissions from fossil fuel inputs for the EU regions from the 
EU 2016 Reference Scenario. We decompose these figures using sectoral shares derived from the 
GTAP database. We add emissions from industrial processes. To do so, we use the World Input 
Output Database (WIOD, 2012), which includes emission figures with a very detailed breakdown 
of emission sources, i.e. 20 fossil energy carriers, relevant renewable energy sources and other 
sources. For each region and sector, we can derive process emissions from the data on “Emissions 
from other sources”.8 
 
For the economic development up to 2030, we use data from both the EU 2016 Reference 
Scenario and the International Energy Outlook from the US Department of Energy (IEO, 2013).9 
The former is used to calibrate most variables related to the EU regions of the model: energy 
inputs, prices of energy carriers, economic growth, and carbon prices. We complement these with 
data from the IEO 2013 for the non-EU regions. 
 
Table 1: Sectoral coverage of the model 
Main aggregates Sectors 
Extractive activities Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
 Coal production 
 Crude oil extraction 
 Natural gas extraction 
 Mining, n.e.c. 
Industries covered by the EU ETS Pulp and paper 
 Refineries and coke oven production 
 Fertilizer production 
 Organic chemical production 
 Inorganic chemical production 
 Cement production 
 Bricks and tiles production 
 Glass production 
 Ceramics production 
 Basic iron and steel production 
 Further processing of iron and steel 
 Aluminium production 
                                                 
8 “Emission from other sources” in WIOD do, however, not include land use emissions. 
9 The IEO 2013 provides detailed regional data on total and fuel-specific primary energy consumption and carbon 
emissions given assumptions on the development of GDP, fossil fuel prices and other factors. The data take 
population growth and exogenous technical progress into account. 
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Main aggregates Sectors 
 Production of other non-ferrous metals 
 Air transport 
 Electricity 
Industries not covered by the EU ETS Food production 
 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather 
 Manufacture of wood and wood products 
 Other chemicals, rubber, plastics production 
 Production of other non-metallic minerals 
 Manufacture of electrical and electronic 
equipment 
 Manufacture of machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
 Motor vehicles and parts 
 Other transport equipment 
 Other manufacturing 
 Construction 
Other services Inland transport 
 Water transport 
 Business services 
 Private services 
 Public services 
2.2 General equilibrium model 
The analysis employs the PACE model, a multi-region, multi-sector recursive-dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy use. Each region in the 
model includes one representative agent which provides capital, labour and resources to the 
production sectors. The most important model features are briefly summarized below.  
 
Production. Each region includes one representative firm per production sector, which is owned 
by the representative agent. Firms use primary factors provided by the representative agents and 
intermediate inputs to produce output. The production structure in each sector is specified using 
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. We assume constant returns to scale for 
all sectors. In contrast to the top-down approach which underlies the other sectors of the model, 
the electricity sector is modelled as a bottom-up module for the EU regions. It differentiates the 
following energy carriers: coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear energy and renewable energy sources. By 
using technology-specific capital inputs based on exogenous data, electricity outputs for each 
energy source are computed. As in the other sectors, the production structure is based on nested 
constant elasticity of substitution functions. The resulting price of electricity is then included as an 
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input price for the other model sectors. Capital in the electricity and resource extraction sectors are 
assumed to be sector-specific. We assume full mobility of capital and labour between the other 
sectors within each region. Firms maximize profits in perfectly competitive markets subject to 
their technology constraints. 
 
Consumption. The consumer chooses a bundle of consumption goods that maximizes her utility 
given her preferences and budget. The budget is determined by the income received from selling 
the primary production factors (labour, capital and fossil fuels) that she owns and from government 
transfers. Moreover, she partly receives income from the revenues generated by auctioning 
emission permits. The extent of this income is, however, dependent on the policy scenarios 
described in section 3.2. Final demand of the representative consumer is modelled as a constant 
elasticity of substitution composite. 
 
Equilibrium conditions. Zero-profit and market clearing conditions follow directly from the 
assumptions of profit maximization of firms, perfect competition among them, utility 
maximization of consumers, constant returns to scale in production, and homothety of consumer 
preferences. The latter class of conditions determines the most important endogenous variables of 
the model, i.e. the price of each output good as the unit cost to produce this good. Other endogenous 
variables include sectoral production levels, emissions, carbon prices and the deployment levels 
of the primary production factors. 
 
Government. The government collects tax and tariff revenues and uses them for public 
spending. Government deficit and surplus are passed on to consumers as lump-sum transfers.  
 
Trade. International trade is specified following the Armington approach of product 
heterogeneity (Armington, 1969). Domestic and imported goods for final consumption and for 
their use as intermediate products are distinguished by origin. 10 Domestic and imported varieties 
form a CES composite which determines total supply of each good within the regions. 
 
Böhringer et al. (2009) provide a diagrammatic structure and explain the underlying 
assumptions about the substitution possibilities in the production process of fossil and non-fossil 
goods, consumer preferences, CO2 accounting and the representation of trade links in the model. 
For the sake of compactness, we point the readers to this publication for more details. An updated 
algebraic description of the model and the corresponding nesting structures are presented in the 
appendix. 
 
                                                 
10 Elasticities in international trade are based on empirical estimates reported in the GTAP 9.1 database. 
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2.3 Model development 
Three developments were included in the model: (i) the introduction of an electricity levy 
instrument to support RE with revenues from an electricity consumption tax, (ii) the introduction 
of the possibility for nations to exempt some of their economic sectors from this levy, and (iii) the 
introduction of the possibility for national governments to use carbon auction revenues to subsidize 
power generation from RE. 
In the original version of the model, countries reach their renewable energy objectives in the 
power sector thanks to public support (paid by tax payers). We developed an electricity levy 
instrument by introducing an endogenous tax on electricity consumption in order for the associated 
revenues to cover the support needed by each country to reach a specific RE target share in 
electricity production. We introduced the possibility for countries to exempt some sectors from 
this levy. 
In the model, auction revenues are by default transferred to households as lump-sum rebates. 
For the analysis, we introduced the possibility for national governments to transfer these revenues 
to the electricity sector as a subsidy for production from renewable energy. When carbon auction 
revenues are used to support electricity generation from renewable energy, the public support or 
electricity levy needed to reach the RE target is hence reduced. 
 
3. DESIGN OF POLICY SIMULATIONS 
This section explains how the EU climate and energy policy features required for the analysis 
are simulated and describes the scenarios considered. 
3.1 The EU climate policy and its simulation 
We present how the EU emissions objective is simulated in the analysis, both in the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS and in the other sectors via the effort sharing regulation. We explain how 
we model the EU ETS characteristics, in particular auctioning. We finally describe how we 
simulate the renewable energy policies at the EU and Member States level. 
 
The 2030 climate and energy policy framework (EC, 2014a) includes the EU objective of a 
40% reduction in GHG emissions11 compared to 1990 levels by 2030. This target is further split 
into goals for the ETS and non-ETS sectors based on cost minimization principles (EC, 2014b). 
By 2030, the sectors covered by the EU ETS have to reduce their GHG emissions by 43% 
compared to 2005 levels whereas the sectors not covered by the EU ETS must decrease their 
emissions by 30% compared to 2005 levels (EU, 2018b). For the non-ETS sectors (e.g. transport, 
buildings, agriculture and waste), binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for Member 
States are established under the Effort Sharing Directive (ESD) for the period 2013–2020 (EU, 
2009) and the Effort Sharing Regulation for the period 2021-2030 (EU, 2018a). Member States 
                                                 
11 Energy and non-energy related emissions. 
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are free to choose and design the policy instruments they want to employ to reach their respective 
objectives. 
 
In the modelling exercise, full trade of allowances12 between ETS sectors of all EU Member 
States is simulated such that the cost efficient allocation of permits is eventually achieved. For the 
other sectors, given the fact that the ESD is driven by an attempt to equalize costs across Member 
States, we do not fully represent each Member State’s target in the simulation, but we introduce 
carbon trading between these sectors. In the results section, we hence report the carbon constraint 
in the non-ETS sectors as a non-ETS carbon price. The 2.2% linear reduction factor for the EU 
ETS cap is imposed for the time period 2021-2030. In sectors that are on the carbon leakage list,13 
carbon allowances are freely allocated up to sector specific benchmarks.14 In line with the EU ETS 
and auctioning regulations, full auctioning15 is used for the electricity sector, and, for the remaining 
sectors, 30% of allowances are freely allocated up to sector-specific benchmarks in 2020 (this 
share is to be reduced to 0% by 2027, i.e. 2030 in the simulation). A 1% flat rate is applied to the 
benchmark of the sectors on the carbon leakage list.16  
 
In aggregate, for the time period 2021-2030, at least 57% of emissions permits are auctioned 
and the rest is freely allocated.17 
 
Regarding renewable energy, the 2030 climate and energy framework defined an overall EU 
objective of 27% share of renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption by 2030.18 
In our simulations, this target is reflected at the Member State level by an increase in the share of 
                                                 
12 In this study, we assume that the respective targets apply to CO2 emissions. 
13 This list includes the following sectors: Refined oil and coal products/ Crude oil extraction/ Cement/ Bricks, 
tiles and construction products/ Glass/ Ceramics/ Manufacturing of iron and steel/ Aluminium/ Fertilizers and other 
nitrogen compounds/ Organic chemicals/ Inorganic chemicals/ Paper, pulp and printing products. This list mirrors 
the carbon leakage list of the European Commission (2014/746/EU, Annex, Commission Decision of 27 October 
2014) to the extent possible, given the sectoral coverage of the model in comparison to the very detailed (NACE 4 
classification) original list. 
14 We model free allocation as an output subsidy allocated to the firms, i.e. firms in a first step buy all of their 
emission permits and are then given back the value of a specific share of these permits, i.e. the benchmarked 
emissions. 
15 In our simulations, we do not take into account the fact that eight new Member States make use of derogation 
under Article 10c of the EU ETS directive, which allows them to issue a decreasing number of free allowances 
in the electricity sector. Some of these MS will even make use of this option beyond 2020 
(http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/in-dex_en.htm). 
16 This means that, in 2025 and 2030, these sectors respectively receive only 85% and 80% of the respective 
benchmark allowances (based on 2007/2008 data) for free. 
17 Regarding the structural surplus of allowances, which has accumulated since 2014 and is included in the Market 
Stability Reserve (MSR) that starts in 2019, we assume that the additional allowances from the MSR will not be used 
before 2030.  
18 In June 2018, the European Commission, Parliament and Council reached a political agreement that sets the 
renewable energy target to 32% by 2030, with an upwards revision clause by 2023. 
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renewable energy in the electricity sector in line with the potential contribution of the electricity 
sector to the overall RE target, i.e. a 45% share of RE in power generation. Even though the EU 
legislation does not set any RE target at Member State level, our modelling framework does require 
setting national targets, translated in shares of RE in power generation. 19 These shares are based 
on the EUCO30 scenario of the European Commission (E3MLab and IIASA, 2016) and presented 
in Table 2. The targets for the aggregate regions (other Western MS, other Eastern MS) were 
computed as the weighted average taking into account national electricity demand. 
 
Table 2: Assumed renewable energy share in power generation in 2030 based on EUCO30 scenario (in 
percent of the total power production) 
Model region Share of RE 
in power 
generation 
(%) 
France 37.2 
Germany 45.6 
Italy 51.9 
Poland 26.5 
Spain 68.8 
United Kingdom 49.9 
Rest of Western MS 62.1 
Rest of Eastern MS 36.3 
 
3.2 Scenarios 
Six scenarios are considered. They correspond to the combinations of three possible policy 
features and are presented in Table 3. First, EU Member States are free to set the type of renewable 
energy support policy they want.20 Most of them, except the United Kingdom, Poland and Finland, 
finance these support schemes by an electricity levy (paid by electricity consumers). Second, in 
the countries where an electricity levy applies, some sectors, e.g. energy intensive industries, may 
be exempted. For this reason, we first consider three scenarios: PUBLIC, in which RE support is 
publicly funded; LEVY, in which RE support is financed by an electricity levy paid by all 
electricity consumers; and LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT, in which RE support is financed by an 
electricity levy paid by all electricity consumers except the ETS sectors. Third, Member States are 
free to choose how to use the ETS auction revenues. Two ways are considered. One is to transfer 
                                                 
19 This split is purely indicative: Member States will have the possibility to propose national contributions towards 
the EU RES target in their forthcoming national energy and climate plans.  
20 The renewable energy support policies used by European countries are reported in detail on the RES LEGAL 
website: http://www.res-legal.eu/. 
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revenues to households as a lump sum. That is the option considered for the PUBLIC, LEVY and 
LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT scenarios. The alternative option studied here is to use these revenues to 
support power generation from RE. This option is applied in the corresponding PUBLIC_REN, 
LEVY_REN and LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN scenarios.21,22 
 
Table 3: Summary of policy scenarios 
 
In the next section, the results are presented as percentage changes relative to the PUBLIC 
scenario. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, we first quantify the economic effects of using an electricity levy to fund RE 
support in comparison to using public money. This helps to understand the general equilibrium 
effects that are connected with recycling auction revenues to support renewable energy, and which 
we examine afterwards. 
4.1 Electricity levy versus public support for RE 
If RE support is funded via an electricity levy, the aggregate energy demand as well as the 
electricity demand is reduced due to a price effect: as electricity consumers have to pay this levy 
                                                 
21 In these three scenarios, support to RE paid by tax payers or electricity consumers is reduced in the proportion of 
the auction revenues used for that purpose. 
22 In France and Germany, the total amount of auction revenues is higher than the aggregate support needed to reach 
the renewable energy target. Therefore, we consider that only 60% and 80% of the carbon revenues in Germany 
and France, respectively, are recycled for RES support. 
 RE support funding 
 Public budget Electricity levy paid 
by all consumers 
Electricity levy paid by all 
consumers except ETS 
sectors 
Auction revenues 
are transferred to 
households 
PUBLIC LEVY LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT 
Auction revenues 
are used to 
subsidize power 
production from 
RE 
PUBLIC_REN LEVY_REN LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN 
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in addition to the electricity price,23 they tend to reduce their electricity consumption. This 
distortionary tax induces a loss in GDP. This result is well known in the literature. In this section, 
we quantify these effects in order to better understand what happens when auction revenues are 
used to support RE in section 4.2. Table 4 reports the aggregate electricity and fossil fuel demand, 
the carbon price and non-ETS carbon constraint as well as GDP for all scenarios for the EU28 in 
2030, in comparison to the PUBLIC scenario.  
In the scenarios with a levy, the electricity demand is -2.2 to -4.5% lower than in the PUBLIC 
scenario; the fossil demand is -0.2 to -0.4% lower. This induces a lower ETS carbon price (-2.2% 
to -4.1% lower), which is directly associated with the reduction in electricity demand, and a higher 
non-ETS carbon constraint (between 6.3% and 14.6% higher), caused by the substitution of 
electricity by fossil energies in the production sectors. We observe a small GDP loss (-0.1 and -
0.2%) when RE support is funded via an electricity levy. The reason is that the electricity levy 
applies to a smaller tax base and implies more distortion than funding RE support via the general 
public budget. This economic activity loss is particularly true for the electricity consumers 
(households and industries) that have to pay the levy. This is illustrated in Figure 1, Figure 2 and 
Figure 3, which are analysed in more detail in section 4.2. 
We note that if an electricity levy is employed, exempting the ETS sectors induces higher 
aggregate energy and electricity demands: for example, in the LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT scenario, 
the electricity demand is 4.1% lower than in the PUBLIC scenario, while it is 4.5% lower in the 
LEVY scenario. This is understandable as the absence of a levy for the ETS sectors leaves them 
better off and encourages them to use more electricity than if they had to pay this contribution. 
This may induce a very slight rise in the ETS carbon price: 0.13% in the LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT 
scenario compared to the LEVY scenario. 
 
4.2 Using carbon auction revenues to support RE 
The impact of recycling carbon auction revenues to subsidize renewable energy depends on 
how this support is financed. If the funding for the latter comes from the general public budget, 
this recycling option has no impact in our simulation. The reason is that, in our exercise, we assume 
that the government deficit and surplus are passed on to consumers as lump-sum transfers. While 
in the PUBLIC scenario households receive the carbon auction revenues as lump-sum transfers, in 
the PUBLIC_REN scenario, carbon auction revenues are not directly given to households: they 
are used to support RE, but the induced surplus for the government is reallocated to households, 
which then see the transfers they receive unchanged. We report this scenario as an element of 
comparison. 
If RE support is funded via an electricity levy, we expect three mechanisms to take place. First, 
households do not receive the auction revenues as a lump-sum transfer any more. This should 
result in a reduction of their aggregate consumption (negative income effect). Second, when 
auction revenues are directly used to support electricity generation from renewable energy, the 
                                                 
23 In this analysis, the electricity price does not include the electricity levy. 
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electricity levy, which households and industries have to pay for their electricity consumption to 
support power generation from RE, is reduced. This results in a positive income effect and a 
reduction of the distortionary effects of the levy. For households, this should partly balance the 
negative income effect mentioned previously. Third, we expect the reduction in the electricity levy 
to induce a rise in the electricity consumption by industries and households (price effect).  
We indeed observe a rise in electricity demand in the whole economy, as can be seen in Table 
4. The electricity demand is 2.4% lower in LEVY_REN compared to the PUBLIC scenario while 
it is 4.5% lower in LEVY (corresponding to a 2% increase). Similarly, the electricity demand is 
reduced by 2.2% in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN and by 4.1%% in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT. This 
directly explains the higher ETS price in the scenarios with the renewable energy subsidy: a 1.6% 
increase in LEVY_REN compared to LEVY, a 1.8% increase in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN 
compared to LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT. This ETS price increase is consistent with the finding of 
Nordhaus (1993) that the optimal carbon tax is higher if the associated revenues are used to reduce 
distortionary taxes than if they are lump-sum transferred to households. Our result extends this 
finding to the case of an ETS. 
 
 
Table 4: Carbon price, fossil fuel demand and GDP for the EU28 aggregate in 2030 
Indicators 
P
U
B
LI
C
_R
EN
 
LE
V
Y 
LE
V
Y_
R
EN
 
LE
V
Y_
ET
S_
EX
EM
P
T 
LE
V
Y_
ET
S_
EX
EM
P
T_
R
EN
 
CO2 price ETS (2010 €) 77.2 74.0 75.2 74.1 75.4 
CO2 price non-ETS (2010 €) 163.9 182.8 174.3 187.9 176.8 
GDP (% change vs. baseline) 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Fossil fuel demand (% change vs. baseline) 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 
Electricity demand (% change vs. baseline) 0.0 -4.5 -2.4 -4.1 -2.2 
Primary energy consumption (% change vs. baseline) 0.0 -2.5 -1.5 -2.4 -1.4 
 
The sectoral impacts of the recycling options are now presented. They are a combination of 
three effects: the reduction of the electricity levy is a benefit for the industrial electricity 
consumers, the increased carbon price induces a loss for the sectors covered by the carbon markets, 
and, for all sectors, the increased overall economic activity results in an increased demand. We 
differentiate below the non-ETS and the ETS sectors as the electricity levy exemption for the latter 
in some scenarios results in a change in the effect of the carbon revenues recycling option.24 
 
                                                 
24 Detailed results for the output of all sectors are presented in Table 12 in Appendix 6.4. 
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 4.2.a Non-ETS sectors 
For the non-ETS sectors, we expect at least two effects to take place. On the one hand, using 
auction revenues to subsidize RE electricity generation should leave the non-ETS sectors better 
off because the electricity levy they have to pay is reduced. On the other hand, they can be 
disadvantaged by a possible increase in energy prices (a small electricity price increase due to a 
larger demand from the whole economy, and a subsequent small price increase for some fossil 
fuels). The final effect is a balance of the two and results in small variations. For the most 
electricity intensive of the non-ETS sectors the combined impact is positive. For example, the 
Food and beverage sector, which is relatively electricity-intensive compared to the other non-ETS 
sectors (cf. ranking of ETS and non-ETS sectors according to their electricity and energy 
intensities in appendix), slightly benefits as shown in Figure 1 below: the change in sectoral output 
is respectively -0.11 and -0.20 in the LEVY and LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT scenarios in comparison 
to PUBLIC, while it is only -0.02 and -0.07 in LEVY_REN and LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT REN. For 
other non-ETS sectors, the effects mentioned above balance one another and the final impact is 
minor. As an example, for the manufacturing sectors (e.g. Machinery and Equipment), the sectoral 
output changes compared to the PUBLIC scenario are between -0.10 and -0.15% for all scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 1: Change in output for two selected non-ETS sectors in 2030 (% 
change compared to the PUBLIC scenario) 
-0.60
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
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Some sectors such as Inland Transport sector benefit from this recycling option (cf. Figure 2) 
due to a demand effect from the non-ETS sectors that have to pay the electricity levy and are better 
off when the latter is reduced: for example, the sectoral output of this sector is reduced by 0.58% 
in the LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT scenario relative to the PUBLIC scenario, but by 0.30% in the 
LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN case.  
 
In aggregate, despite the fact that the activity of some non-ETS sectors is higher when auction 
revenues are used to support renewable electricity, the non-ETS carbon price is smaller (a 5.9% 
reduction in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN compared to LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT). The reason is 
that the reduced electricity levy allows these sectors to make use of cheaper abatement 
opportunities, in particular, through a larger use of electricity (a 3.3% change in electricity demand 
from all non-ETS sectors in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN compared to LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT). 
 
 4.2.b ETS sectors 
The impact of using carbon revenues to support RE on the output of the ETS sectors is still a 
combination of the three effects described above (reduced electricity levy, increased carbon and 
energy prices, increased economic activity) and depends on the potential electricity levy exemption 
for these sectors (see Figure 3 for three selected sectors). If they have to pay the electricity levy, 
the recycling of the auction revenues to support electricity production from RE results in a 
reduction of the levy. This positive income effect leaves the ETS sectors better off: -1.35% in 
aluminium sector output in LEVY _REN compared to the PUBLIC scenario in contrast with -2.3% 
in LEVY; -0.52% in the sector of iron and steel manufacturing in LEVY_ REN compared with -
0.94% in LEVY. In aggregate, the ETS sectors use 3.4% more electricity than if auction revenues 
are transferred to households. The GDP is slightly higher when auction revenues are used to 
 
Figure 2: Change in output for Inland transport in 2030 (% change compared 
to the PUBLIC scenario) 
-0.60
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support RE: -0.1% in the LEVY_REN scenario compared to PUBLIC, -0.2% in the LEVY 
scenario. This is consistent with the finding of Ballard and Medema (1993), relative to the 
efficiency gain due to the reduction of other – distortionary – taxes that a Pigouvian tax allows. 
Our result extends this finding to the case of an ETS. As explained in section 4.1, employing an 
electricity levy induces a slight GDP loss due to its distortionary effects. These are reduced when 
the use of auction revenues to support RE allows a reduction in the levy. 
If the ETS sectors are exempted from the levy, the difference in application of the latter to the 
various economic sectors induces general equilibrium effects. The increased electricity demand in 
the whole economy results in a higher ETS carbon price and a slight increase in the price of 
electricity in some countries (for example 3% in France in the scenarios with the subsidy compared 
to the scenarios without). This has a negative impact on the ETS sectors. In parallel, however, the 
demand from the non-ETS sectors increases. As a consequence, the final outcome for the ETS 
sectors is a balance of the two effects (see detailed sectoral results in appendix). Sectors such as 
Fertilizers, Organic chemicals and Inorganic chemicals still benefit from the recycling option, as 
the demand effect dominates for them. As an example, the output for Fertilizers is reduced by 0.5 
% in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT compared to PUBLIC, but only by 0.3% in LEVY-
ETS_EXEMPT_REN. This is likely due to the demand by the agricultural sector (output reduced 
by 0.3% in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT compared to PUBLIC, and by 0.1% in 
LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN). On the contrary, the most electricity intensive ETS sectors are 
worse off as a consequence of the use of auction revenues to subsidize renewable electricity 
generation and the consequent increased energy and carbon prices: for the aluminium sector, the 
output rises by 0.5% in the LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT scenario relative to the PUBLIC scenario, 
compared with 0.1% in LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN; for the sector of iron and steel 
manufacturing, the respective changes are 0.3% and 0.1%. 
In aggregate for the whole economy, the GDP is slightly better (-0.1% change in 
LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT_REN relative to PUBLIC, compared with -0.2% in 
LEVY_ETS_EXEMPT). This is explained by the increased output in some non-ETS sectors. 
These sectors are not exempted from the levy but they have a significant use of electricity and 
benefit when auction revenues are used to support RE electricity. We explain the improvement in 
terms of GDP by the reduction of the electricity levy and the associated distortionary effect.  
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Except for electricity, which is obviously better off when benefiting from a subsidy, the impacts 
of this auction revenues recycling option on the output of the ETS as well as non-ETS sectors does 
not result in significant changes in their world market shares. We explain this by pointing to the 
fact that the sectoral changes are relatively small. This is an interesting result in the policy context 
of the Energy Union Package (EC, 2015), in which industrial competitiveness concerns are taken 
into consideration. 
 
Besides the analysis of the sectoral impacts on ETS and non-ETS sectors, we observe that, in 
our simulation, the effect of this carbon revenues recycling method on households is negligible. 
The reason is that households do not receive the auction revenues as a lump-sum any more but 
they benefit from the increased economic activity. In order to fully inform policy-makers about 
the social impacts of such a scheme, the analysis could be complemented by a microsimulation 
approach comparable to the one conducted by Böhringer et al. (2017). 
 
Regarding the environmental impacts of such a scheme, we note that the auctions recycling 
method does not change the cap of the EU ETS, nor the mitigation objectives in the non-ETS 
sectors. On an environmental level, it may only have an impact on co-pollutants via the sectoral 
output changes described above. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As ETS’s are being developed by an increasing number of nations as instruments in order to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, behavioural studies have shown that the political and public 
 
Figure 3: Changes in output of selected sectors in 2030 (% change compared to 
the PUBLIC scenario) 
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acceptability of these instrument depends on the use of the associated revenues. An option the 
general public approves of is to employ revenues to support renewable energy development. 
This analysis aims at examining the economic impact of such a recycling option as a function 
of the type of RE policy funding and potentially associated sectoral exemption rules. It extends the 
literature on environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes to carbon pricing in the form of 
an emissions trading scheme, in the presence of a distortionary commodity tax - the electricity levy 
- that heterogeneously applies to the various sectors of the economy. 
The study is conducted on the EU case and takes account of the EU objectives regarding 
emissions reductions and renewable energy as stated in the 2030 climate and energy framework. 
The methodology employed uses detailed sectoral data on ETS and non-ETS sectors, data which 
are gathered and combined to develop the PACE model. The scenarios analysed include public 
support for RE, the use of an electricity levy with or without exemptions for the energy intensive 
sectors, and the associated scenarios in which carbon auction revenues are recycled to support RE 
instead of being transferred to households. 
In our analysis, public support for renewable energy results in better outcomes for the whole 
economy than an electricity levy (-0.2% GDP loss with levy) due to the distortion the latter induces 
and the cost it implies for electricity consumers (households and industries). Only ETS sectors 
benefit if they are exempted from this levy. 
If auction revenues are used to support RE and reduce the levy, the distortionary effect is 
diminished and there is a relative GDP improvement (-0.1% GDP loss instead of 0.2%). The ETS 
price rises (+1.6% if no levy exemption applies, +1.8% if ETS sectors are exempted) as a result of 
the higher electricity demand, but a reduction of the climate constraint (−4.6% if no levy exemption 
applies, −5.9% if ETS sectors are exempted) is observed in the non-ETS sectors, which can use 
more electricity. The impact on each economic sector is a combination of three effect: a positive 
income effect associated with the electricity levy reduction for the industrial electricity consumers, 
a loss induced by higher energy and carbon prices for the most energy intensive sectors, an 
increased demand from the whole economy. For the non-ETS sectors, the outcome is either 
balanced or positive but, in all cases, small. The impact on the ETS sectors depends on the 
exemption rules. If they have to pay the electricity levy, the recycling of the auction revenues to 
support RE results in a positive income effect for them and leaves them better off. On the contrary, 
if the ETS sectors are exempted, the use of auction revenues to subsidize renewable electricity 
generation leaves the most energy intensive ones worse off. Despite an increase in the demand 
from the non-ETS sectors that have to pay the electricity levy and are better off when the latter is 
reduced (e.g. demand for fertilizers by the agricultural sector), some of the ETS sectors that benefit 
from a levy exemption see their benefit from the exemption reduced due to increased carbon and 
energy prices. That is for example the case of the cement, iron and steel, glass, and aluminium 
sectors. 
The impacts of this auction revenues recycling option on the output of the ETS as well as non-
ETS sectors does not result in significant changes in their world market shares. We explain this by 
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pointing to the fact that the sectoral changes remain relatively small. This is interesting in the EU 
context, where competitiveness is part of the objectives of the energy and climate policy. 
The effect of shifting carbon revenues to support RE on households is negligible. Even if the 
latter do not directly receive the auction revenues any more, they benefit from the increased 
economic activity. To obtain a more detailed analysis of the social impacts of such a scheme, we 
would suggest using a microsimulation approach comparable to the one used by Böhringer et al. 
on Germany (2017). 
With regard to the environmental effects, we remind that using the auction revenues to support 
RE does not alter the cap of the EU ETS, nor the emission reductions objectives in the non-ETS 
sectors. The only environmental impact it could have is on co-pollutants due to the output changes 
of industrial sectors. 
Our study has interesting policy implications regarding renewable energy support, potentially 
associated exemption rules and interactions with carbon revenues recycling options. Such a 
recycling method has no significant impact if there is public support for RE and if government 
deficits and surpluses are passed on to households as lump-sum transfers. On the contrary, if an 
electricity levy is used to finance RE, the reduction of this levy, as a consequence of using carbon 
revenues to subsidize power generation from RE, induces a reduction of the distortionary effects 
of this levy and a GDP improvement. 
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6. APPENDIX 
 
6.1 Algebraic model summary 
 
Table 5: Activity variables 
Variable Description 
𝑦𝑖,𝑟  Aggregate production in sector 𝑖 and region 𝑟 
𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒  
Aggregate production in electricity sector of region 
𝑟 and technology 𝑡𝑒𝑐 
𝑦𝑥𝑒,𝑟 
Aggregate production of exhaustible resource 𝑥𝑒 in 
region 𝑟 
𝑦𝑖,𝑟
𝐴  Armington aggregate in sector 𝑖 and region 𝑟 
𝑦𝑖,𝑟
𝑀  Import of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝑦𝑟
𝑊 Welfare in region 𝑟 
 
 
Table 6: Price variables 
Variable Description 
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌  Price of aggregate output of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌  
Price of aggregate output in electricity sector of 
region 𝑟 and technology 𝑡𝑒𝑐 
𝑝𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑌  
Price of aggregate output of exhaustible resource 𝑥𝑒 
in region 𝑟 
𝑝𝑗,𝑖,𝑟
𝐴  Price of Armington good in sector 𝑖 and region 𝑟 
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑀  Price of import good in sector 𝑖 and region 𝑟 
𝑝𝑖
𝑇  Price of transport good in sector 𝑖 
𝑝𝑟
𝑊 Welfare price in region 𝑟 
𝑣𝑟  Return to capital in region 𝑟 
𝑤𝑟  Wage rate in region 𝑟 
𝑞𝑥𝑒,𝑟 Rent to exhaustible resource 𝑥𝑒 in region 𝑟 
𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2  Price of emission permits in region 𝑟 
 
 
Table 7: Additional variables 
Variable Description 
𝑅𝐴𝑟 Income level of representative agent in region 𝑟 
𝜇𝑟  Subsidy on renewable energy 
𝜏𝑟  Tax on electricity consumption in region 𝑟 
𝜓𝑟  Green quota in power production in region 𝑟 
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Table 8: Cost shares 
Parameter Description 
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡  
Benchmark cost share of materials in aggregate 
output of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐸  
Benchmark cost share of energy in capital-labor-
energy composite of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾  
Benchmark cost share of capital in value added 
composite of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙  
Benchmark cost share of the coal-CO2 permit 
composite in energy composite of sector 𝑖 in region 
𝑟 
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙  
Benchmark cost share of the oil-CO2 permit 
composite in oil-gas composite of sector 𝑖 in region 
𝑟 
𝜃𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚  
Benchmark cost share of coal in coal-CO2 permit 
composite in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑚  
Benchmark cost share of oil in oil-CO2 permit 
composite in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚
 
Benchmark cost share of gas in gas-CO2 permit 
composite in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝐾  
Benchmark cost share of capital in electricity 
generation for technology 𝑡𝑒𝑐 in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝐿𝑀  
Benchmark cost share of material-labor composite 
in non-technology input of electricity sector in 
region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝐿  
Benchmark cost share of material-labor composite of 
electricity sector in region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑅  
Benchmark cost share of exhaustible resource 𝑥𝑒 in 
region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑠,𝑟
𝑌  
Benchmark cost share of goods from region 𝑠 in 
Armington aggregate of region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑠,𝑟
𝑀  
Benchmark cost share of goods from region 𝑠 in 
aggregate import good of region 𝑟 
𝜃𝑗,𝑖,𝑠
𝑇  
Benchmark cost share of transport good from 
region 𝑠 from sector 𝑗 to sector 𝑖 
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Table 9: Endowments 
Parameter Description 
𝐾𝑟̅̅ ̅ Capital endowment in region 𝑟 
𝑘𝑖,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅  
Benchmark capital demand in the value added nest 
of sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝑡𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Benchmark capital demand in electricity sector of 
technology 𝑡𝑒𝑐 in region 𝑟 
𝐿𝑟̅̅ ̅ Labor endowment in region 𝑟 
𝑙𝑖,𝑟̅̅̅̅  
Benchmark labor demand in the value added nest of 
sector 𝑖 in region 𝑟 
𝑄𝑥𝑒,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Endowment of resource 𝑥𝑒 in region 𝑟 
𝑐𝑖,𝑟,𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Benchmark bilateral trade flows 
𝐶𝑂2𝑟
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ CO2 emissions target in region 𝑟 
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Renewable target in region 𝑟 
 
Table 10: Elasticities 
Parameter Description 
𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸𝑀  
Substitution between materials and the energy-
value added composite 
𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸  
Substitution between energy and the value added 
composite 
𝜎𝐾𝐿 Substitution between capital and labor 
𝜎𝑁𝐸𝐿 Substitution between coal and the oil-gas composite 
𝜎𝐿𝑄𝐷 Substitution between oil and gas 
𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐 
Substitution between technology-specific capital 
and the non-technology inputs composite in 
electricity generation 
𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑠 
Substitution between resources and the materials-
value added composite in resource extraction 
𝜎𝐴 Armington elasticity 
𝜎𝑀  Substitution between imports by origin country 
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Zero-profit conditions 
 
1. Sectoral output (except for electricity in the EU regions and for fossil fuel resources) 
 
(𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡 (∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑖,𝑟
𝐴 (1 + 𝜏𝑟)
𝑗
)
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸𝑀
+ (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡)(𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑟)
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸𝑀
)
1/(1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸𝑀)
≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌  
⊥ 𝑦𝑖,𝑟 
 
 
where 
𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑟 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐸 (𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑟)
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸
+ (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐸 )𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑟
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸)
1/(1−𝜎𝐾𝐿𝐸)
 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑟 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾 𝑣𝑟
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾 )𝑤𝑟
1−𝜎𝐾𝐿)
1/(1−𝜎𝐾𝐿)
 
 
𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑟 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑁𝐸𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙)𝑙𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑁𝐸𝐿)
1/(1−𝜎𝑁𝐸𝐿)
 
 
𝑙𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑟 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑟
1−𝜎𝐿𝑄𝐷 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙)𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑟
1−𝜎𝐿𝑄𝐷)
1/(1−𝜎𝐿𝑄𝐷)
 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
 
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
and 
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
 
 
2. Electricity (only in the EU regions – 𝜓𝑟 only applies to 𝑡𝑒𝑐 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛) 
 
(𝜃𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝐾 (∑ 𝑣𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝑡𝑒𝑐
)
1−𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐
+ (1 − 𝜃𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝐾 )𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐)
1/(1−𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐)
≥ 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌 (1 + 𝜓𝑟)(1 + 𝜇𝑟)
⊥ 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒  
 
where 
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝐿𝑀 𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟; (1 − 𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝐿𝑀 )𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟} 
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𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝐿 ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝐴
𝑗∖𝑓𝑒
; (1 − 𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝐿)𝑤𝑟} 
 
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟; 𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟; 𝜃𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟} 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
 
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
and 
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑟
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑟
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚)𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2} 
 
 
3. Resource extraction 
 
(𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑅 𝑞𝑥𝑒,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑅 )𝑘𝑙𝑚𝑥𝑒,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑠)
1/(1−𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑠)
≥ 𝑝𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑌  ⊥ 𝑦𝑥𝑒,𝑟 
 
where 
 
𝑘𝑙𝑚𝑥𝑒,𝑟 = max
 
{𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝑀𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑟
𝑌
𝑗
; 𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝐾 𝑣𝑟; 𝜃𝑥𝑒,𝑟
𝐿 𝑤𝑟} 
 
4. Armington aggregate 
 
(∑ 𝜃𝑠,𝑟
𝑌 𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌 1−𝜎
𝐴
𝑠
)
1/(1−𝜎𝐴)
≥ 𝑝𝑗,𝑖,𝑟
𝐴 ⊥ 𝑦𝑖,𝑟
𝐴  
 
5. Imports 
 
(∑ 𝜃𝑠,𝑟
𝑀 𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑖,𝑠
1−𝜎𝑀
𝑠
)
1/(1−𝜎𝑀)
≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑀 ⊥ 𝑦𝑖,𝑟
𝑀  
 
where 
𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑖,𝑠 = max
 
{𝜃𝑗,𝑖,𝑠
𝑇 𝑝𝑖,𝑠
𝑌 ; (1 − 𝜃𝑗,𝑖,𝑠
𝑇 )𝑝𝑗
𝑇} 
 
6. Welfare 
 
∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑟
𝑌
𝑗
≥ 𝑝𝑟
𝑊 ⊥ 𝑦𝑟
𝑊 
 26 
 
 
Market-clearing conditions 
 
7. Sectoral output 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑟,𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑠
𝑦𝑖,𝑠
𝐴 (
𝑝𝑖,𝑠
𝐴
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌 )
𝜎𝐴
⊥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌  
 
8. Capital 
 
𝐾𝑟̅̅ ̅ ≥ ∑ 𝑡𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑡𝑒𝑐
𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟 (
𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌
𝑣𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
)
𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐
+ ∑ 𝑘𝑖,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑦𝑖,𝑟 (
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌
𝑣𝑟
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑤𝑟
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾 )
𝜎𝐾𝐿
𝑣𝑟
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑤𝑟
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑣𝑟
𝑖
⊥ 𝑣𝑟 
 
9. Labor 
 
𝐿𝑟̅̅ ̅ ≥ ∑ 𝑙𝑖,𝑟̅̅̅̅ 𝑦𝑖,𝑟 (
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝑌
𝑣𝑟
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑤𝑟
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾 )
𝜎𝐾𝐿
𝑣𝑟
𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑤𝑟
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑟
𝐾
𝑤𝑟
𝑖
⊥ 𝑤𝑟 
 
10. Armington 
 
∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑠,𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑟
𝐴 ≥ ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑠,𝑟𝑦𝑟
𝑊
𝑝𝑟
𝑊
𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝐴
𝑠𝑠
⊥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑟
𝐴  
 
11. Welfare 
 
𝑦𝑟
𝑊 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑠,𝑟
𝑖,𝑠
≥
𝑅𝐴𝑟
𝑝𝑟
𝑊 ⊥ 𝑝𝑟
𝑊 
 
12. Emissions (only for emissions regulating regions and for both the ETS and NETS market 
segments) 
 
𝐶𝑂2𝑟
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ≥ 𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝑟 + 𝑦𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑟 + 𝑦𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑟 ⊥ 𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2 
 
Constraints 
 
13. Green quota in power production 
 
𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒
𝑡𝑒𝑐
⊥ 𝜓𝑟 
 
14. Tax on electricity consumption (does not apply to sectors exempted from electricity levy) 
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𝜏𝑟 ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑖,𝑟
𝐴
𝑖
𝑦𝑖,𝑟 = 𝛼𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌 𝜓𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒 ⊥ 𝜏𝑟 
 
15. Subsidy on renewable energy (as a recycling option of permit auctioning revenues) 
 
𝜇𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒 = 𝛽𝑟𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2 ∑ 𝑏𝐶𝑓𝑒,𝑟
𝑓𝑒
⊥ 𝜇𝑟 
 
Income balance 
 
16.  
 
𝑅𝐴𝑟 = 𝐾𝑟̅̅ ̅𝑣𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟̅̅ ̅𝑤𝑟 + ∑ 𝑄𝑥𝑒,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑥𝑒
𝑞𝑥𝑒,𝑟 + ∑ 𝑡𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑡𝑒𝑐
𝑣𝑡𝑒𝑐,𝑟 + 𝐶𝑂2𝑟
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑝𝑟
𝐶𝑂2 − 𝜇𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒
+ 𝜏𝑟 ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑖,𝑟
𝐴
𝑖
𝑦𝑖,𝑟 − 𝜓𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒,𝑟
𝑌 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑟
𝑒𝑙𝑒 ⊥ 𝑅𝐴𝑟 
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6.2 Regional coverage of the model 
 
Table 11: Regional coverage of the model 
Main aggregates Countries or groups of countries 
EU regions Germany (DEU) 
 France (FRA) 
 United Kingdom (GBR) 
 Spain (ESP) 
 Poland (POL) 
 Italy (ITA) 
 
Rest of Western Member States: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece, Malta, Cyprus (XWE) 
 
Rest of Eastern Member States: Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania (XEE) 
Non-EU regions United States of America (USA) 
 Canada (CAN) 
 Japan (JPN) 
 Russia (RUS) 
 Australia (AUS) 
 Turkey (TUR) 
 Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Ukraine, Belarus, 
New Zealand (RAX) 
 
 
 China, incl. Hong Kong, excl. Taiwan (CHN) 
 India (IND) 
 Brazil (BRA) 
 South Korea (KOR) 
 Indonesia (IDN) 
 Mexico (MEX) 
 South Africa (ZAF) 
 Rest of the World (ROW) 
 
 
  
 29 
 
6.3 Electricity and energy intensities of industrial sectors 
 
 
Figure 4: Electricity intensity of model sectors (toe/M€) for the baseline scenario in 2010 
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Figure 5: Energy intensity of model sectors (toe/M€) for the baseline scenario in 2010 
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6.4 Detailed sectoral results 
Table 12: Sectoral output for the EU28 aggregate in 2030 (% change vs. baseline) 
Sectoral output (% change vs. baseline) 
P
U
B
LI
C
_R
EN
 
LE
V
Y 
LE
V
Y_
R
EN
 
LE
V
Y_
ET
S_
EX
EM
P
T 
LE
V
Y_
ET
S_
EX
EM
P
T_
R
EN
 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Crude oil 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 
Gas 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 
Mining 0.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 
Paper, pulp and printing 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 
Refined oil and coal products 0.0 -1.6 -0.9 -1.2 -0.7 
Fertilizers 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 
Organic chemicals 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Inorganic chemicals 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Cement 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
Bricks, tiles, construction products 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
Glass 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.1 
Ceramics 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
Iron and steel - manufacturing 0.0 -0.9 -0.5 0.3 0.1 
Iron and steel - further processing 0.0 -1.1 -0.6 0.6 0.3 
Aluminium 0.0 -2.3 -1.4 0.5 0.1 
Other non-ferrous metals 0.0 -1.6 -0.9 0.4 0.1 
Air transport 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Electricity 0.0 -4.9 -2.9 -4.6 -2.8 
Food and beverages 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Wood 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 
Other chemicals, rubber, plastic 0.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.7 
Other non-metallic minerals 0.0 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.6 
Electronic equipment 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 
Machinery and equipment 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Motor vehicles 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Other manufacturing 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Inland transport 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 
Water transport 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 
Business services 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Private services 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Public services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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